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SYMPOSIUM
THE NEW CIVIL DISTURBANCE REGULATIONS: 
-
THE THREAT OF MILITARY INTERVENTION
DAVID E. ENGDAHLt
INTRODUCTION
In February 1972, the Nixon administration promulgated new
regulations concerning the employment of federal military resources
to deal with civil disturbances.2 These new regulations, which, for con-
venience, will be referred to as the "Civil Disturbance Regulations," take
the place of earlier regulations that had been promulgated under the
Johnson administration in 1968' and discontinued in November 1971.'
The 1968 regulations were themselves open to criticism on several points
of law, as will be pointed out in the course of this study; but in addition
to preserving the objectionable features of the old regulations, the
new Civil Disturbance Regulations dramatically increase the likelihood
of federal troop utilization in domestic situations while significantly
reducing the safeguards against their abuse. These new regulations
give a color of legality to almost unprecedented military intrusibs into
the realm of domestic government. Moreover, they present some ominous
possibilities that a people attached to free civilian institutions cannot
afford to dismiss lightly. It would be temeritous to predict that these
extreme possibilities will be realized; but it would be folly, if the
possibilities exist, to ignore them.
The stated purpose of the Civil Disturbance Regulations is to
establish policies and furnish guidance for the utilization of federal
troops and other Defense Department resources "[i]n support of civil
authorities during civil disturbances" and "[i]n other related instances
where military resources may be used to protect life or Federal property
or to prevent disruption of Federal functions." 5  Virtually the same
t Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law of
Cleveland State University (1974-75) ; Associate Professor of Law, University of Colo-
rado.
1. "Military resources include military and civilian personnel, facilities, equipment,
and supplies under the control of DOD component." 32 C.F.R. § 215.3 (c) (1973). This
definition does not encompass National Guard troops that have not been federalized.
2. Employment of Military Resources in the Event of Civil Disturbances, 37 Fed.
Reg. 3637 (1972), 32 C.F.R. pt. 215 (1973).
3. 33 Fed. Reg. 9339 (1968), 32 C.F.R. pt. 187 (1971).
4. 36 Fed. Reg. 21339 (1971).
5. 32 C.F.R. § 215.1 (1973).
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language appeared in the 1968 regulations.' The innovations introduced
by the draftsmen of the new regulations, however, invite their applica-
tion in circumstances which rather clearly were not within the con-
templation of the earlier regulations at all, and in which, more impor-
tantly, the utilization of military force is clearly unwarranted under the
Constitution and federal case and statute law. This lack of authority
for the new Civil Disturbance Regulations becomes clear, however, only
after careful examination of the constitutional and statutory premises
on which the regulations purport to rest.
Recently, Chief Justice Burger observed on behalf of a unanimous
Supreme Court that
[w]hile both federal and state laws plainly contemplate the use
of force when the necessity arises, the decision to invoke
military power has traditionally been viewed with suspicion
and skepticism since it often involves the temporary suspension
of some of our most cherished rights-government by elected
civilian leaders, freedom of expression, of assembly and as-
sociation.'
On other occasions the Supreme Court has denounced even more force-
fully the improper intrusion of military resources into civil affairs, even
where the intrusion has come at the instance of a chief executive.' This
traditional abhorrence of military measures for dealing with domestic
civil and political problems, which is an element of the constitutional
concept of civilian "due process," has roots that run more than seven
centuries deep in Anglo-American history;9 and it was prominent in
the minds of the statesmen who gave birth to our Republic. Their Decla-
ration of Independence railed against the King for his offenses against
this tradition;"0 and they took pains in preparing their original state
6. 32 C.F.R. § 187.1(b) (1971).
7. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1691 (1974) (the Kent State case) (emphasis
added).
8. The most eloquent case on point is Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) Z
(1866). See also Johnson v. Jones, 44 II. 142, 147, 92 Am. Dec. 159, 163 (1867), an
Illinois Supreme Court opinion of the same era. Milligan has been cited and reaffirmed
in more recent cases, one of the most notable being Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378
(1932). Sterling was reaffirmed in Scheuer, 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974).
9. The history is traced in great detail in Engdahl, Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution:
The Law and History of Military Troops in Civil Disorders, 57 IOWA L. Rav. 1 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution].
10. British troops had been used, for some time before open hostilities broke out, to
suppress dissent and disorder in the colonies. See Soldier, Riots, and Revolution, supra
note 9, at 22-28. In their Declaration of Independence the revolutionary statesmen de-
nounced the King as having "affected to render the Military independent of and superior
to the Civil Power."
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constitutions" as well as in drafting formative federal legislation 2 to
preserve the tradition intact. Some specific aspects of this tradition will
be pointed out in the pages that follow, as the defects and implications
of the new Civil Disturbance Regulations are explored.
Both the old and the new Civil Disturbance Regulations articulate
at length their purported legal foundations.'" The bases claimed by the
new regulations, however, are more numerous and far broader, includ-
ing extravagant claims to inherent executive power. The breadth and
significance of these newly asserted powers of military intervention in
domestic affairs can be adequately appreciated only if viewed against
some statutory and historical background. The next two parts of this
article explore that background.
THE STATUTES IN TITLE 10
The old and the new Civil Disturbance Regulations both rely, as
authority for the domestic use of troops in certain circumstances, upon
three federal statutes presently codified as Title 10 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332,
and 333. The origin and terms of each of these three statutes must be
examined before the additional bases of power claimed in the new
regulations are explored.
10 U.S.C. § 331
Whenever there is an insurrection in any State against
its government, the President may, upon the request of its
legislature or of its governor if the legislature cannot be con-
vened, call into Federal service such of the militia of the other
States, in the number requested by that State, and use such
of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to suppress the
insurrection.
This statute is derived from section 1 of the very first statute en-
acted by Congress pertaining to military troops and domestic unrest, a
statute enacted in 1792.4 The 1792 Act was drafted and adopted in
lieu of a provision that was stricken from the Senate version of the
11. For the provisions inserted in the original state constitutions, see Soldiers, Riots,
and Revolution, stpra note 9, at 28-31.
12. See text accompanying notes 14-46 infra.
13. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4 (1973) ; 32 C.F.R. § 187.4 (1971).
14. Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264. As originally enacted it authorized
only the use of federalized state militia; but after the development of standing federal
armed forces another enactment in 1807 authorized the use "for the same purposes, [of]
such part of the land or naval force of the United States, as shall be judged neces-
sary . . . ." Act of March 3, 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443.
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so-called Militia Bill a few weeks earlier because of vigorous opposition
in the House. 5 The unacceptable proposal had provided that the Presi-
dent could call out troops "to execute the laws of the Union, suppress
insurrections, and repel invasions."' "  The House debate on that
proposal 7 indicates that there was no apprehensiveness over the use
of military force in circumstances so grave as invasion or insurrection,
but that the prospect of military force for law enforcement in any lesser
exigency was the subject of very serious concern. Judging from the
debate and from the more elaborate provisions that were enacted a few
weeks later in lieu of the original proposal, what was found unacceptable
about the original proposal was its failure to take account of an essential
legal distinction (to be examined below) bearing upon the utilization
of military personnel for law enforcement in circumstances less severe
than invasion or outright insurrection. Section 1 of the Act that was
finally adopted in 1792 omitted any reference to executing the laws of
the Union, and instead dealt only with two circumstances in which it
seems to have been agreed that distinctively military force is warranted:
invasion, and insurrection against the government of a state.' So
much of that section as pertained to insurrection as distinguished from
invasion is the antecedent of current 10 U.S.C. § 331.19
This legislative history tends to confirm that what is contemplated
by the term "insurrection" in 10 U.S.C. § 331 is something quite
different from riot, tumult, or civil disorder. The latter circumstances
might indeed present a need for additional manpower to enforce the
15. The Militia Bill was Congress' first measure under U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl.
16, ."[t] provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia . . . ." As fi-
nally enacted, the Bill became the Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271.
16. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 114-15 (1792) (emphasis added).
17. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 553-55 (1792).
18. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That whenever the United States shall
be invaded, or be in imminent danger of invasion from any foreign nation or
Indian tribe, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, to call
forth such number of the militia of the state or states most convenient to the
place of danger or scene of action, as he may judge necessary to repel such in-
vasion, and to issue his orders for that purpose, to such officer or officers of the
militia as he shall think proper; and in case of an insurrection in any state,
against the government thereof, it shall be lawful for the President of the
United States, on application of the legislature of such state, or of the executive
(when the legislature cannot be convened) to call forth such number of the
militia of any other state or states, as may be applied for, or as he may judge
sufficient to suppress such insurrection.
Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, § 1, 1 Stat. 264.
19. It will be noted that the statute only authorizes the President to call in militia
from states other than the requesting state. The National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders in its REPORT, at page 288 (GPO ed. 1968), found this curious and "appar-
ently unintended." If the statute is construed in accordance with its history and purpose,
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laws; but this statute does not provide for those needs, and it certainly
does not provide for those needs to be met with military resources. The
term "insurrection" in the statute is to be understood in the light of
the rule, inherited from English law, that military force could lawfully
be employed against the titizenry only when there was such an uprising
specifically against the duly constituted government that the courts of
the common law had been forced to close.2" The congressional debates
however, this is not curious at all; it may be expected that a state faced with insurrec-
tion would employ its own militia as a matter of course, and federal assistance would be
needed only when the state's own militia proved inadequate to the task, and outside help
was needed.
20. The crucial distinction between governing the realm in accordance with rea-
soned rules of law and governing by sheer force and prerogative was recognized when
King John by Magna Carta promised in dealing with his nobles to be governed by
"legem terre" [the law of the land]. Magna Carta, ch. 29 (1215). In the fourteenth
century that pledge was taken as authority by Parliament for holding that it was unlaw-
ful for the King to seize traitors and try them and execute them for treason by military
process; so long as the common law courts were open and able to function, to proceed
by military process was to derogate from "the law of the land." See Thomas Earl of
Lancaster's Case, in 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 344-47 (1st ed. 1736) ; Edmund
Earl of Kent's Case, in M. HALE, HisvoRy OF THE COMMON LAW 35-36 (4th ed. C. Run-
nington 1792). When the armed citizenry who constituted both the posse and the
militia rose up to suppress the Peasants' Revolts of 1381 with measures of force more
appropriate to their role as a military force than to their role as the posse comitatus, the
common law would have punished them for their innoderate force if King Richard II
had not extended them his pardon for suppressing the riots "sanz due proces de loye"--
without due process of law. 5 Rich. 2, stat 1, ch. 5 (1381).
The first English riot act was enacted in 1411. In accordance with what had al-
ready become tradition, it provided for suppression of riots by the posse comitatus under
the command of civil officers and made no provision whatsoever for military interven-
tion. 13 Hen. 4, ch. 7 (1411). During the Wars of the Roses and under the Tudors,
absolutist monarchs did resort to the expedient of putting down civil disturbances with
military force; but legal scholars of that period and of our own agree that those mon-
archs' actions were in violation of the law of the land. See F. MAITLAND, THE CoNsTI-
TUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 266-68 (1908). What had been suffered under the
Tudors was to cause revolution under the Stuarts. When Charles I in 1627 sent military
troops instead of relying on the civilian posse comitatus to suppress riots in several
towns, Parliament postponed all of its other business to prepare, under the leadership of
former Chief Justice Lord Coke, the Petition of Right of 1628. That historic document
declared that the practice of dealing with riots by military means was "wholly and directly
contrary to the said laws and statutes of this your realm." 3 Car. 1, ch. 1, § 8. Later,
in his landmark INSTITuTEs OF THE LAws OF ENGLAND, Lord Coke elaborated upon this
thesis, and added that for a soldier to kill a civilian under a claim of military authority,
at a time when civilian courts were open, would be murder. E. COKE, THIRD INSTTUTE,
ch. vii, at 52v.-52r. When Charles persisted in employing military measures to solve do-
mestic problems even after the Petition of Right, it led directly to revolution and the
execution of the King. After the Restoration, the principle that military measures must
never be employed domestically so long as the civilian institutions of the law remain
operable was reiterated by Lord Chief Justice Hale, in his HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAw, supra, at 34-36, and then reconfirmed by enactment of the 1689 Bill of Rights,
1 W. & M. 2, ch. 2 (1689).
When England was beset with scattered riots and disturbances in protest of the
Hanoverian succession in 1714, Parliament enacted a new riot act to correct the defects
which the developments of three centuries had created in the old. Just like the 1411
statute, however, the 1714 riot act provided for suppressing riots by the posse comitatus
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on the 1792 legislation illustrate that this rule was very much on the
minds of that early Congress,2 and most of the American authorities
have continued to adhere to the rule.22 Only a handful of "insurrec-
tions" within the fair and constitutional meaning of this statute have
been experienced in American history: for example, the Civil War,
Shays' Rebellion (1786-87), the Whisky Rebellion (1794), the Dorr
Rebellion (1842), and the 1856 civil war in the Territory of Kansas.
Executive officials under the pressures of seeming emergencies
have sometimes, out of expediency, asserted a much broader scope for
this statute, taking the term "insurrection" to encompass mere riot,
tumult, and civil disorder.2" The Civil Disturbance Regulations reflect
this assertion, claiming authority by virtue of 10 U.S.C. § 331 to employ
troops to deal with any "domestic violence" on request of the states.2 '
"Domestic violence" is a constitutional term, found in the guaranty
clause which provides that the federal government on request of the
states is to "protect each of them . . . against domestic Violence. 25
This constitutional term, however, comprehends far more than the
extreme exigency of "insurrection." The terms are not equivalent, and
to equate them is to obscure essential constitutional principles that were
clear in the minds of the early statesmen who prepared the Constitution
and who enacted the 1792 legislation from which 10 U.S.C. § 331 is
derived.
In the case of an actual insurrection, organized political society
is in extemis; the situation is tantamount to war. In such circum-
under the control and command of the ordinary local civilian officers, and contained not
a hint of any authorization for the use of military troops to suppress any civil disorder,
however aggravated the circumstances might be. 1 Geo. 1, stat. 2, ch. 5 (1714). This
confirmed a principle that the struggles of the seventeenth century had firmly ensconced
as a fundamental precept of due process of law. Blackstone, writing on the eve of
American independence, ratified this principle that military force could not be used so
long as the courts could function. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *152. His re-
statement served to punctuate the colonists' own assertion of their due process heritage
in this regard.
21. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 574-77 (1792).
22. E.g., Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863) ; Sterling v. Constantin, 287
U.S. 378 (1932) ; Constantin v. Smith, 57 F.2d 227 (E.D. Tex. 1932); Bishop v. Vander-
cook, 228 Mich. 299, 200 N.W. 278 (1924). See also Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d
797 (8th Cir. 1958); Wilson & Co. v. Freeman, 179 F. Supp. 520 (D. Minn. 1959);
Middleton v. Denhardt, 261 Ky. 134, 87 S.W.2d 139 (1935) ; Seaney v. State, 188 Miss.
367, 194 So. 913 (1940); Ex Parte McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 143 P. 947 (1914); and
Russell Petroleum Co. v. Walker, 162 Okla. 216, 19 P.2d 582 (1933).
23. This misconstruction of 10 U.S.C. § 331 has given rise to various practical
problems, which were noted in the REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL
DISORDERS 287 (GPO ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
24. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c) (2) (i) (a) (1973). See also the old regulations, 32 C.F.R.§ 187.4(c) (1) (1971).
25. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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stances, it is necessary and appropriate for the government to employ
force which is distinctively military in character. It was only in such
extreme situations-foreign invasion and genuine insurrection-and
never in cases of mere riot or civil disorder, that the English tradition
which the founding fathers endeavored to preserve permitted the domes-
tic application of distinctively military force. 8
Some type of federal force to deal with "domestic violence" that is
less severe than "insurrection" against a state is certainly contemplated
by the Constitution. Nothing in the Constitution, however, suggests
that federal protection from these less severe forms of "domestic
Violence" must be in the form of distinctively military force-or even
that it may. The fact is that early American legal doctrine and ensuing
decades of practice disclose an alternative federal force, not distinctively
military in character, which consistently with the Constitution could
be utilized in circumstances less severe than insurrection. The doctrine
derived from a principle articulated by England's Lord Chief Justice
Mansfield in 1780. British troops ("Redcoats") had been employed
to suppress rioters in London during the highly destructive Lord Gordon
Riots in June of that year."' Afterwards, Lords and Members of Parlia-
ment aware of the English tradition forbidding military force in domestic
affairs debated whether this use of troops had been lawful. Responding
to those who denounced it as reminiscent of the abusive -applications of
military force and martial law in 1628 under Charles I,28 Lord Mansfield
rose to justify the utilization of the troops.
The Chief Justice justified the use of the "Redcoats" by drawing
an essential legal distinction between their utilization in a military
capacity, as a distinctively military force, and the utilization of those
same organized units of troops in a civilian capacity, in the nature of
the posse comitatus under civilian command. He explained:
I presume it is known . . . that every individual, in his
private capacity, may lawfully interfere to suppress a
riot . . . . Not only is he authorized to interfere for such a
purpose, but it is his duty to do so; and, if called upon by a
magistrate, he is punishable in case of refusal. What any
single individual may lawfully do for the prevention of crime
26. See note 20 supra.
27. For accounts of the Lord Gordon Riots, see 3 J. CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE
CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 402-21 (3d ed. 1874) ; Proceedings Against Lord George
Gordon, 21 State Trials 485 (1781) ; Rex v. Kennett, 5 Car. & P. 282, 172 Eng. Rep.
976 (1781).
28. See note 20 supra.
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and preservation of the public peace, may be done by any
number assembled to perform their duty as good citizens. It is
the peculiar business of all constables to apprehend rioters, to
endeavor to disperse all unlawful assemblies, and, in case of
resistance, to attack, wound, nay, kill those who continue to
resist ;--taking care not to commit unnecessary violence, or to
abuse the power legally vested in them. The persons who
assisted in the suppression of these tumults are to be considered
mere private individuals, acting as duty required. My Lords.,
we have not been living under martial law . . . . Supposing
a soldier, or any other military person, who acted in the course
of the late riots, had exceeded the powers with which he was
invested, I have not a single doubt that he may be punished,
not by a court-martial, but upon an indictment ....
The King's extraordinary prerogative to proclaim
martial law (whatever that may be) is clearly out of the
question. . . . The military have been called in-and very
wisely called in-not as soldiers, but as citizens. No matter
whether their coats be red or brown, they were employed,
not to subvert, but to preserve, the laws and constitution which
we all prize so highly.29
This Mansfield doctrine that military units or personnel may be
used in a civilian capacity in circumstances in which their utilization
as a distinctively military force would be illegal soon made its way
across the Atlantic to the new American states. It is true that the
records of the 1787 Federal Convention do not reflect any discussion of
the Mansfield doctrine in connection with the guaranty clause" or the
militia clause31 of the Constitution. This could be, as I had earlier
argued, 2 because the draftsmen of those clauses intended them to apply
only in cases amounting to treason or insurrection. Or it could be, as
now seems to me more likely, because the Mansfield doctrine was already
well enough understood and accepted among American statesmen to be
regarded as implicit in those clauses. 3 In any event, discussion of
29. 21 THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 688-98 (W. Cobbett ed. 1814).
Mansfield's doctrine was applied in Rex v. Kennett, 5 Car. & P. 282, 294, 172 Eng. Rep.
976, 984 (1781), and again in Rex v. Pinney, 5 Car. & P. 254, 263 n.(b), 172 Eng. Rep.
962, 967 n.(b) (1832).
30. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4.
31. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
32. Soldiers, Riots, and Re'volution, supra note 9, at 35-39.
33. Another possibility, of course, is that the draftsmen rejected the Mansfield doc-
trine, repudiated the traditional English rule forbidding military force, and actually in-
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these clauses during the period of ratification and afterwards brought
the Mansfield doctrine with its essential distinction into prominence.
Fear of the abusive use of military force was one of the factors feeding
resistance to ratification of the Constitution, "4 which resistance led to
the early adoption of amendments. The due process guaranty of the
fifth amendment incorporates the traditional English prohibition against
distinctively military force in domestic situations short of insurrection,"5
and the clauses authorizing the use of federal armed force can be squared
with that prohibition only by application of the Mansfield doctrine.
For nearly seventy years, at least, military troops were utilized
both by the states and by the federal government, in accordance with the
Mansfield doctrine, as a civilian force under the direction of civil officers
essentially as a posse comitatus, to suppress riots and otherwise assist
in the enforcement of civilian laws, while their use in such circumstances
as a distinctively military force was regarded as unlawful. It was clearly
understood that when they were so used the military personnel were
civilian in character, subject to the command of the ordinary civilian
officials and bound by civilian rather than military law, and no more
privileged in their use of force against citizens than the civilian officers
themselves might be." An 1854 opinion of the Attorney General of
the United States discussed the practice of using military troops in this
civilian capacity. Specifically citing Lord Mansfield's discussion of the
point, the Attorney General observed: "The fact that they are organized
as military bodies, under the immediate command of their own officers,
does not in any wise affect their legal character. They are still the
posse contitatus."7
The 1792 Act from whose first section Title 10 U.S.C. § 331 is
derived took account of this principle. Section 9 of that Act secured
to federal marshals and their deputies
the same powers in executing the laws of the United States, as
sheriffs and their deputies in the several states have by law,
in executing the laws of their respective states.3"
tended to authorize distinctly military force even for situations short of treasonous re-
sistance to law and genuine insurrection. However, the legislation of the earliest Con-
gresses, here being discussed, as well as decades of consistent practice in accordance with
the Mansfield doctrine, militate against this view.
34. See Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution, supra note 9, at 40-42.
35. Id. at 42-43.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 27 F. Cas. 1339, 1342-43 (No. 16,401)
(Crim. Ct. D.C. 1857) ; Ela v. Smith, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 121, 143, 66 Am. Dec. 356, 366
(1855). See also cases cited supra note 22.
37. 6 Op. Ar'Y GEm. 466, 473 (1854).
38. Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, § 9, 1 Stat. 264, 265. The Judiciary Act of 1789
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Sheriffs in the states, of course in accordance with the Mansfield
doctrine, had power to use state soldiers (i.e., the militia) as their
posse.
Consistent with this Mansfield doctrine, it would have been per-
missible for Congress pursuant to the guaranty clause 9 to have authorized
the use of federal troops in a civilian capacity as a civilian force under
civilian officers and laws to protect a state, when requested, against
"domestic Violence" less severe than genuine insurrection against the
government of that state. Congress, however, chose not to do so,
apparently concluding that in situations short of insurrection a state's
own resources, including its militia employed as a civilian posse, should
be sufficient. Section 1 of the 1792 Act provided for federal assistance
only in cases of "insurrection." Its descendant and modem counterpar,
10 U.S.C. § 331, provides for nothing more. Some commentators have
suggested that well-trained and specialized federal troops might be a
more effective and safer force for controlling disorders in the states
today than the typical force of state militia (i.e., National Guard). In
fact, § 331 has been used a few times, without challenge in the courts,
as a pretext for sending federal troops into requesting states to sup-
press riots and enforce state law. The Report of the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders recommended in 1968 that § 331 be
amended to legitimate this legally dubious utilization of federal troops."0
To legitimate it would indeed take an amendment of the statute, because
§ 331 does not authorize it now. But for such utilization to be constitu-
tionally legitimate, the troops would have to be used in a civilian capacity,
and not as a distinctively military force.
10 U.S.C. § 332
Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstruc-
tions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the
authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce
the laws of the United States in any State or Territory by
the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into
Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such
of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those
laws or to suppress the rebellion.
This statute derives from yet another section of the 1792 statute
had already given federal marshals "power to command all necessary assistance in the
execution of [their] duty . . . ." Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 27, 1 Stat. 73, 87.
39. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4.
40. REPORT, supra note 23, at 288.
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already discussed; but it was profoundly altered by amendment during
the era of the Civil War. Section 2 of the 1792 Act provided
[t]hat whenever the laws of the United States shall be op-
posed, or the execution thereof obstructed, in any state, by com-
binations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course
of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals
by [section p of] this act, . . . it shall be lawful for the Presi-
dent of the United States to call forth the militia of such state
to suppress such combinations, and to cause the [federal] laws
to be duly executed."'
An 1807 statute made it lawful for federal troops as well as state militia
to be used by the President in such circumstances.42
In contrast to section 1 of the 1792 Act, section 2 concerned the
enforcement of federal law. Like section 1, however, it rather clearly
contemplated the utilization of troops in their capacity as a distinctively
military rather than a civilian force, under no civilian officer other than
the President as commander-in-chief. Their utilization in this distinc-
tively military capacity was authorized by this section, however, only
in circumstances in which the resistance was "too powerful to be sup-
pressed" by civilian means, including the use of military troops as a
civilian force under the command of federal marshals pursuant to sec-
tion 9 of the 1792 Act. 3 In other words, this section, while not utiliz-
ing the word "insurrection," contemplated circumstances comparable
to those contemplated by section 1 but involving assaults upon federal
rather than upon state authority: uprisings specifically against
established civil authority, disrupting "the ordinary course of judicial
proceedings,"" which civilian federal officials even by exhausting their
resources (including troops employed by marshals as a civilian posse)
could not suppress.
So understood, section 2 of the 1792 Act in authorizing distinc-
tively military force -was quite consistent with the rule, adopted from
the English tradition and constitutionalized in the Bill of Rights
guaranty of civilian due process, which prohibited the use of distinc-
tively military force against citizens except when civil government was
under such assault that civilian institutions, such as the courts, were
41. Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, § 2, 1 Stat. 264.
42. Act of March 3, 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443.
43. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
44. Recall that the traditional due process test of whether military force could be
.used was whether the courts had been forced to close, see note 20 supra.
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incapacitated. When it was first introduced, however, this section
aroused fears among many members of Congress, because as originally
drafted it did not so clearly confine its authorization of distinctively
military force to such in extremis cases. Vigorous opposition was
aroused by the section, and several members denounced it as much too
indulgent of the use of military force. 5 The heated debate spawned
several amendments to the bill. It was one of these amendments that
added section 9, countenancing the use of military troops as civilians
under the command of federal marshals, in the nature of a posse. As
finally enacted, section 2 of the 1792 Act specified that the distinctively
miliary force that it authorized was permissible only when the marshals,
even with such troops employed as their posse, proved Unable to suppress
the resistance to federal authority. 6
By the time of the Civil Whr, however, demands for open military
action to settle great national issues had caused politicians as well as
the public to become impatient with fine distinctions between "civilian"
and "military" utilization of military troops, and thus the stage was set
for a profound change in this statute. President Buchanan had used
a confused misapprehension of the traditional constitutional rule as an
excuse for refusing to send troops into the secessionist states." When
Lincoln became President, he not only discarded Buchanan's miscon-
struction and proceeded, in accordance with the constitutional rule, to
meet the insurrection with military force. Moreover, he and his par-
tisans in Congress went further, authorizing various military measures
unwarranted by the Constitution, even in the loyal states. Some of
these excesses were denounced by the courts,48 and some others were
45. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 574-77 (1792).
46. One of the other amendments spawned by the House debate required the is-
suance of a proclamation to disperse before troops could be utilized under section 1 or
section 2 of the 1792 Act. This provision survives in substance as 10 U.S.C. § 334
(1970), which provides:
Whenever the President considers it necessary to use the militia or the
armed forces under this chapter, he shall, by proclamation, immediately order
the insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their abodes within a limited
time.
Another amendment, which has not survived, required that the circumstances of civilian
incapacity prerequisite to the use of distinctly military force under section 2 be certified
by a Supreme Court Justice or a district judge.
47. Buchanan referred to the practice of using troops as a posse to assist federal
civilian officials, but asserted that it was of no avail because the federal civilian officials
had been driven out of the dissident states! 5 J. RICHARsoN, A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 634 (1897).
48. E.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 124-25 (1866) ; Beckwith v. Bean,
98 U.S. 266, 296-98 (1878) ; Milligan v. Hovey, 17 F. Cas. 380, 381 (C.C.D. Ind. 1871) ;
Johnson v. Jones, 44 Ill. 142, 160-61, 92 Am. Dec. 159, 174-75 (1867) ; Griffin v. Wilcox,
21 Ind. 370, 388-89 (1863).
CIVIL DISTURBANCE REGULATIONS
saved from probable invalidation only by deft manipulation of federal
court jurisdiction. 9  One of the acts of Lincoln's Congress-one that
was never judicially challenged-was an Act of 186150 that replaced
section 2 of the 1792 Act and survives as 10 U.S.C. § 332.
The 1861 Act made it quite explicit that troops used under this
statute were to be used in their distinctively military capacity, subject
to the Articles of War.5 More significantly, the new Act deleted the
language referring to "the powers vested in the marshals" to utilize
troops as a posse. "2 The most significant change, however, was that
the 1861 Act purported to authorize the use of distinctively military
force "whenever . . . it shall become impracticable, in the judgment
of the President" to enforce federal laws "by the ordinary course of
judicial proceedings. . . ."" The 1792 Act had restricted distinctively
military measures to circumstances in which the resistance was "too
powerful to be suppressed" by civilian means; the 1861 Act purported
to allow military measures whenever civilian means seemed "impractica-
ble." This was a profound change, indeed; and the fact that recourse
to the only "practicable" civilian means of dealing with serious civil
disturbances-troops in a civilian capacity under federal marshals-was
no longer statutorily required as a prerequisite, underscores the change.
Title 10 U.S.C. § 332 as it stands today is essentially unchanged
since the 1861 Act. It has never been subjected to judicial scrutiny.
If the established constitutional principles were to be applied to this
statute, it seems clear that it could not survive judicial review. Since
the statute has never been challenged, however, it continues to be
claimed as broad authority for military intervention in civil affairs. It
is claimed as authority by the new Civil Disturbance Regulations, " as
it was by the earlier regulations that they replaced.5
10 U.S.C. § 333
The President, by using the militia or the armed forces,
49. See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wail.) 506 (1868).
50. Act of July 29, 1861, ch. 25, 12 Stat. 281.
51. Id., § 3, 12 Stat. at 282.
52. The new Act did contain a counterpart to § 9 of the 1792 Act, which had served
along with a section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (see note 38 supra) as the basis of the
posse conitatus practice. Act of July 29, 1861, ch. 25, § 7, 12 Stat. 281, 282, Rev. Stat.
1874, § 788; see note 50 supra. However, the new Act's replacement for § 2 of the 1792
Act did not require, as the 1792 Act had, that such civilian force be exhausted before
distinctively military force were applied.
53. Act of July 29, 1861, ch. 25, § 1, 12 Stat. 281.
54. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c) (2) (i) (B) (1973).
55. 32 C.F.R. § 187.4(c)(2) (1971).
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or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as
he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrec-
tion, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy,
if it-
(1) so hinders the execution af the laws of
that State, and of the United States within the State,
that any part or class of its people is deprived of a
right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the
Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted
authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to
protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give
that protection; or
(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the
laws of the United States or impedes the course of
justice under those laws.
In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be
considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws
secured by the Constitution.
This statute originated with the efforts of Reconstruction Era
Radicals to suppress at all costs the die-hard Southern resistance to the
social consequences of the Civil War. It derives, without substantive
change, from section 3 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871.5" Already
engaged in other nakedly military measures of reconstruction in the
South, of highly dubious constitutionality," the Radical Congress did
56. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 3, 17 Stat. 13, 14.
57. See notes 48 & 49 supra. Congressional Radicals in 1866 secured passage of a
bill providing that any person in the formerly secessionist states charged of infringing
the rights of a freedman should be tried by a military tribunal or by an agent of the
Freedmen's Bureau in accordance with martial law, but President Johnson vetoed this
patently unconstitutional measure. See veto message, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
915-17 (1866).
In 1867 the Radicals passed, over the President's veto, the Military Reconstruction
Act. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428-29. Even though loyal civilian govern-
ments had already been established in the formerly seceded states in accordance with the
less extreme reconstruction plans of Presidents Lincoln and Johnson, this Act recited in
its preamble that "no legal State governments or adequate protection for life or property
now exists in the rebel States. . . ." Id., 14 Stat. 428. The Act then proceeded to
create five military districts, encompassing those states, and to provide for their gover-
nance by martial rule until a civilian government acceptable to the Radical Congress
should be installed. Although by the hypothesis of the Act there were no civilian govern-
ments in those states, the Act provided that the military commanders could, in their
discretion, "allow local civil tribunals to take jurisdiction of and to try offenders. ... "
Id., § 3, 14 Stat. 428. Otherwise, offenders were to be tried by military tribunals. Id.
Another measure enacted four months later, again over the President's veto, author-
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not hesitate to give this carte blanche approval to distinctively military
methods of enforcing the new equal protection requirement of the
fourteenth amendment.
The 1871 Act made no distinction between "insurrection" and
mere "violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy;" for any of these
circumstances it purported to authorize distinctively military force:
[I]n all such cases,. . it shall be lawful for the President,
and it shall be his duty to take such measures, by the employ-
ment of the militia or the land and naval forces of the United
States, or of either, or by other means, as he may deem
necessary for the suppression of such insurrection, domestic
violence, or combinations. .... 5i
Moreover, this 1871 Act contained no requirement that civilian means
of federal law enforcement be first exhausted. The Act was confined
to circumstances in which state authorities "shall either be unable 'to
protect, or shall, from any cause, fail in or refuse protection of the people
in [their federal constitutional] rights .. . . ,I' but there was no re-
quirement that a civilian federal force such as the federal marshals using
military personnel or units as their posse, be considered or employed
before resort to distinctively military force.
In other words, this 1871 Act, adopted by a Radical Congress
during the period of nakedly militaristic post-war Reconstruction, dis-
plays the very features that had so alarmed many members of the Con-
gress in 1792. At that time, when members of Congress were more
aware of, and more loyal to, the traditional and constitutional restraints
on the domestic application of military force, outspoken opposition had
forced amendments in the bill that then was pending, in order to con-
form the legislation to constitutional requirements."0 Among the post-
Civil War Radicals, however, there was no such appreciation of the
civilian constitutional tradition; and the 1871 Act was adopted despite
its patent inconsistency with this constitutional tradition.
Unless this settled constitutional tradition is now to be discarded,
it is hard to conceive how 10 U.S.C. § 333, derived from the Radicals'
ized the military commanders to remove and replace any official of the civilian govern-
ments of those states, and even provided specifically that "no [military] district com-
mander," nor any officer acting under him, "shall be bound in his action by any opinion
of any civil officer of the United States." Act of July 19, 1867, ch. 30, §§ 2, 10, 15 Stat.
14, 16.
58. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 3, 17 Stat. 13, 14.
59. Id.
60. See text accompanying notes 45 & 46 spra.
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1871 Act, could survive a judicial test. Its constitutionality, however,
has never been litigated. Nonetheless it is the pretext upon which federal
troops have been utilized as a distinctively military force, including the
great Pullman strike of 1894 and various racial disturbances and urban
riots during the turbulent decade of the 1960's. It is claimed as authority
in the new Civil Disturbance Regulations," as it was in the regulations
of 1968.62
In sum, of the three sections in Title 10 of the United States Code
that are claimed as authority for the Civil Disturbance Regulations, only
one-§ 331-seems sustainable in the face of constitutional tradition
and precedents dealing with the utilization of military troops in domestic
situations; and that one section, construed in accordance with its terms
and its history, applies only in cases of genuine insurrection specifically
against the duly constituted government of a state. In other words,
valid statutory authority for the utilization of federal military troops
in riots or other civil disorders, or otherwise to enforce either state or
federal laws, simply does not exist in Title 10.6" It is only because of
the practical factors making litigation under these statutes extremely
difficult64 that they have remained on the books as apparent authority
for military intervention as long as they have. Of course, it is possible
that if they were litigated now courts might ignore the constitutional
tradition and approve the practice of utilizing distinctively military
force that has grown up under the aegis of these statutes. A line of
recent decisions applying the traditional constitutional principles to
restrict the "judicial" as distinguished from the "executive" power of the
military over civilians,6 however, strongly suggests that at least the
United States Supreme Court is not at all likely to forget or ignore those
principles.
This being the case, another statute apart from Title 10 of the
Code takes on great significance. That statute, commonly referred to
as the "Posse Comitatus Act," is not an authorization but rather a
61. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c) (2) (i) (C) (1973).
62. 32 C.F.R. § 187.4(c) (3) (1971).
63. With regard to another asserted statutory basis of authority, see text accom-
panying notes 104-12 infra.
64. The emerging circumstances under which these statutes are resorted to are
normally impossible to predict with certainty, and are usually not of prolonged duration.
The doctrines of ripeness and mootness therefore present barriers at least to litigation
seeking preventive relief.
65. See, e.g., Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971) ; O'Callahan v. Parker,
395 U.S. 258, 272-74 (1969) ; McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281,
283-87 (1960) ; Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278, 280 (1960) ; Kinsella v. United States
ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246-49 (1960) ; Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 30-41 (1957);
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarlesf 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
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limitation upon the domestic utilization of federal troops, and to its
terms, its origins, and its purpose the discussion must now turn.
THE PossE COMITATus ACT
Title 18 U.S.C. § 1385, the Posse Comitatus Act, provides that
[w]hoever, except in cases and under circumstances
expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress,
willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse
comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years,
or both.
Both the old and the new Civil Disturbance Regulations acknowledge
that this statute places some limits on the domestic utilization of federal
troops. However, the new regulations" regard it as much less of a
limitation than the old regulations did; and even the old regulations,6"
because they put too much faith in the statutes in Title 10,68 understated
the significance of this Act.
The Posse Comitatus Act originated as a rider on the Army Ap-
propriation Act of 1878. The controversy that led to its proposal and
enactment explains its purpose and intended effect. Reference has al-
ready been made to the Radicals' measures of military Reconstruction in
the South after the Civil War."9 Near the end of President Grant's
second term, the excesses of military Reconstruction were beginning
to exact a substantial political toll from the Republicans. As voter senti-
ment swung away from the Radical Republicans and toward the Demo-
crats, charges were made that federal troops were intimidating electors
in the South, seizing political prisoners, interfering with civilian govern-
ments in the states, and even going so far as to remove and install state
legislatures
°
In the Presidential election of 1876, Democrat Tilden's popular vote
exceeded that of Republican Hayes by a small margin; but Hayes
won the election in the Electoral College by virtue of the electoral votes
of Louisiana and South Carolina-two states whose Republican Recon-
struction governments were being maintained in power by federal troops.
Democrats in Congress charged after the election that had it not been
66. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(b) (1973).
67. 32 C.F.R. § 187.4(b) (1971).
68. The statutes are discussed in the preceding section of this article, THE STATUTES
IN TITLE 10, supra.
69. See notes 56-57 supra & text accompanying.
70. See 7 CONG. REc. 3849, 3850-51, 3852, 4240, 4245, 4248 (1878).
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for intimidation of the voters by the federal troops, the vote in many
districts in the South would have differed enough to have secured the
Presidency for Tilden and the Democrats.7 ' As a consequence, in Decem-
ber 1876, the House of Representatives passed a resolution calling upon
outgoing President Grant to account for the use that had been made of
federal troops in the states during the several months leading up to that
election. On January 22, 1877, two months before leaving office, Presi-
dent Grant sent the House his reply.7
Grant's reply did not assuage the anti-militaristic sentiment among
the Democrats in Congress; but Hayes as the new President conducted
himself with sufficient restraint in the use of military troops that a show-
down on the issue was postponed." The showdown did come, however,
in 1878, when the members of Congress who were determined to put
an end to military intervention in domestic affairs succeeded in getting
approval of the Posse Comitatus Act as a rider on the Army Appropria-
tion Act of that year.74 The provisions of their rider were directly
responsive to the arguments which President Grant had advanced in
his reply to the House in 1877.
In his reply President Grant had outlined the several legal bases
upon which he considered the domestic use of troops to be grounded."
He cited the guaranty clause with its reference to protecting the states
at their request against "domestic Violence," together with the statute
71. See 7 CONG. REC. 3851, 3852 (1878).
72. The House resolution and President Grant's reply are reprinted in G. LIEBm,
THE USE OF THE ARmY IN Am OF THE CIVIL POWER 4-9 (1898) [hereinafter cited as
LIEBER].
73. President Hayes opened his term with the welcome act of ordering federal
troops out of South Carolina and Louisiana-with the result that the governments of
those states were promptly taken over by the Democrats.
In the second session of the Forty-fourth Congress the House attached provisions
to the Army Appropriation Bill designed to prevent the abusive use of military troops;
but the Senate insisted upon striking the House provisions. Neither house would com-
promise, so no bill was passed. See Field, The Army Bill, 16 ALBANY L.J. 181 (1877);
The President's Relatios to the Army, id. 198. Consequently, for a period of some
months after June 30, 1877, the Army was maintained without any appropriation. Dur-
ing this curious interval when the Army, already reduced by Congress to 25,000 men,
was without authorized appropriation, President Hayes was confronted with the wide-
spread labor riots of 1877. Extravagant counsel was given him by cabinet members and
other advisors, and some industrial leaders in particular pressed him to take forceful
strike-breaking action; but Hayes exercised great restraint in his actual use of federal
military troops, employing them only late in the period of the strike and then only to
,enforce judicial process. It may be that Hayes' restraint helped to moderate sentiment
in the House, for an appropriation bill for the Army for the fiscal year already half
over was enacted on November 21, 1877, which did not include the provisions earlier
insisted upon by the House.
74. Act of June 18, 1878, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 145, 152.
75. For the text of President Grant's reply, see LIEBER, supra note 72, at 4-9.
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now codified at 10 U.S.C. § 331, and, claiming that the situation in
South Carolina had amounted to "insurrection," put them forward as
justification for his utilization of troops there. With regard to some
things that were done in several other states, he relied for justification
upon the statutes now codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 332 and 333, and upon
another Reconstruction era statute of even more dubious constitution-
ality 6 which has not survived to the present day. Although some mem-
bers of Congress may have considered those provisions improperly in-
voked in the circumstances, and some might conceivably even have
perceived their constitutional frailties, no attempt was made at this time
to modify or repeal the statutes.
As to other circumstances in which federal troops had been used,
however, President Grant in his reply relied upon different grounds. For
some circumstances, he relied upon the traditional practice of marshals
using troops as their posse (although it is not clear that either he or the
troops understood the essential distinction between their use in a civilian
and in a distinctively military capacity). He said:
In Florida and in Louisiana, respectively, the small number
of soldiers already in the said States were stationed at such
points in each State as were most threatened with violence,
where they might be available as a posse for the officer whose
duty it was to preserve the peace and prevent intimidation of
voters. Such a disposition of the troops seemed to me reason-
able, and justified by law and precedent, while its omission
would have been inconsistent with the constitutional duty of the
President of the United States "to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed." . . . The stationing of a company or
part of a company in the vicinity, where they would be available
to prevent riot, has been the only use made of troops prior
to and at the time of the elections. Where so stationed, they
could be called, in an emergency requiring it, by a marshal or
deputy marshal as a posse to aid in suppressing unlawful
violence.77
76. Section 9 of the Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866, cl. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 29, re-
enacted after adoption of the fourteenth amendment, Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 13,
16 Stat. 140, 143, Rev. Stat. 1874, § 1989, provided that
it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, or such person as he
may empower for that purpose, to employ such part of the land or naval forces
of the United States, or of the militia, as shall be necessary . . . to prevent
the violation and enforce the due execution of [that Act].
77. Quoted in LIEBER, supra note 72, at 6-7.
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For circumstances that might not fit within either this posse comitatus
principle or any of the statutes aforementioned, President Grant, whose
life-long career as a soldier had hardly taught him to scorn military
force, asserted a "power as commander of the Army and Navy to pre-
vent or suppress resistance to the laws of the United States . .. "-
It was apparently in reliance upon his asserted power that Grant justified
the instances of troop use not supported on other grounds, saying
[t]he companies stationed in the other States have been
employed to secure the better execution of the laws of the
United States and to preserve the peace of the United States."'
In support of this assertion of executive power not derived from any
statute, Grant referred to a hodgepodge of historical precedents-all
of which, however, seem to have been applications either of one of the
statutes or else of the posse comitatus practice.80 In substance, President
Grant was now claiming an inherent executive power to employ military
troops to execute the laws and preserve domestic peace.
Viewed in the light of President Grant's claims, the effect of the
Posse Comitatus Act is plain. It was specifically designed to curtail
the kinds of abuses perceived by Congress in 1876, and those abuses
were considered to arise primarily in circumstances other than those
reached by the specific statutes; thus such "circumstances expressly
authorized" were excepted from the new Act's prohibition. The posse
comitatus practice, however, had been Dased upon a statutory provision
which did not "expressly" authorize use of troops at all; it merely
gave federal marshals the powers of state sheriffs, and it was because of
general reception of the Mansfield doctrine that this had been considered
sufficient to authorize the use of troops in a civilian capacity in a posse."'
78. Id. at 9.
79. Id. at 8.
80. It has been necessary to employ troops occasionally to overcome resistance
to the internal-revenue laws, from the time of the resistance to the collection of
the whisky tax in Pennsylvania, under Washington, to the present time.
In 1854, when it was apprehended that resistance would be made in Boston
to the seizure and return to his master of a fugitive slave, the troops there sta-
tioned were employed to enforce the master's right under the Constitution, and
troops stationed at New York were ordered to be in readiness to go to Boston
if it should prove to be necessary.
In 1859, when John Brown with a small number of men made his attack
upon Harper's Ferry, the President ordered United States troops to assist in
the apprehension and suppression of him and his party, without a formal call of
the legislature or governor of Virginia, and without proclamation of the Presi-
dent.
Id. at 8-9.
81. See text accompanying notes 30-37 supra.
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Consequently, although the wisdom of the prohibition in this respect is
open to question,82 the Act put an end to the practice of marshals
using military units under their own command to enforce federal laws.
3
Even rhore significant, however, in the light of the claims now being
reasserted in the new Civil Disturbance Regulations,"4 is the fact that
this 1878 Act was most emphatically a blunt repudiation by the Congress
of President Grant's assertion of some inherent executive power to
utilize military troops domestically to enforce the laws and preserve the
public peace.85
The Posse Comitatus Act, however, also had another effect, seri-
ously counterproductive of the end at which its supporters had aimed.
That end was curtailment of military intervention in domestic affairs in
82. See text accompanying notes 86-89 infra.
83. The effect of the Act in curtailing the posse comitatus practice was immediately
felt. Less than four months after the Act was adopted, the Attorney General in a for-
mal opinion, entitled Employment of the Military as a Posse, recognized its effect:
It has been the practice of the Government since its organization (so far as
known to me) to permit the military forces of the United States to be used in
subordination to the marshal of the United States when it was deemed necessary
that he should have their aid in order to the enforcement of his process. This
practice was deemed to be well sustained under the twenty-seventh section of the
judiciary act of 1789 [see note 38 supra], which gave to the marshal power "to
command all necessary assistance in the execution of his duty," and was sanc-
tioned not only by the custom of the Government, but by several opinions of my
predecessors. Instructions given by my predecessor, the Hon. William M.
Evarts, of date August 20, 1868, state particularly the authority of the marshal
in this regard, and call attention to the fact that the military in such case obey
the summons of the marshal as a posse comitatus and act in subordination and
obedience to the civil officer in whose aid in the execution of process they are
called, and only for the object of securing its execution.
While the right to summon a portion of the military forces where it can be
spared for the duty, as a part of the posse cosnitatus, is fairly to be inferred
from the provision in the judiciary act which I have already quoted, there is
found, however, no express authority by which the marshal may summon any
military force of the United States as a part of the posse comitatus.
He therefore concluded that the new Act forbade it. 16 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 162, 163 (1878).
Two and one-half years later the Attorney General advised that because of the Act it
would be impermissible to use
a detachment of troops to aid the civil authorities in arresting certain persons in
the State of Kentucky who are charged with the recent robbery of the clerk of
the engineer officer superintending the Government works on the Tennessee
River.
17 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 71 (1881), 333 (1882). Other opinions barred the posse practice,
on account of the Act, in the Territory of Arizona, id. at 242 (1881), 333 (1882) ; in the
Territory of Oklahoma, 19 id. at 293 (1889) ; and in the Territory of Alaska, id. at 368.
84. See text accompanying notes 113-20 infra.
85. No constitutional provision apart from article I, § 8, cl. 15, "expressly" pro-
vides for the use of troops, and that section, as well as article IV, § 4, has been the sub-
ject of implementing legislation, as earlier discussed. The other clauses upon which
President Grant seemed to rely-the commander-in-chief clause of article II, § 2, and
the faithful execution clause of article II, § 3--contain no express authorization for the
use of troops in domestic law enforcement situations.
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the face of the historic civilian tradition of due process.8" But the Con-
gressmen of 1878 had less than a clear perception of that tradition. In
particular, they did not seem to realize how profoundly the recently en-
acted measures of Congress itself 7 offended that tradition. Their Act of
1878 not only left those statutes unchanged, but also gave impetus to a
broadening construction of those statutes, as a result of which the use
of troops in a distinctively military capacity came to be viewed as author-
ized even in circumstances in which the constitutional rule, if it were
called to mind, clearly would forbid it.88 In the end, by curtailing the
posse practice the Act did not insure that military troops would be used
86. See text accompanying notes 69-72 supra.
87. The Acts of 1861 (see text accompanying notes 47-55 supra) ; 1866 (see note
76 supra) ; and 1871 (see text accompanying notes 56-62 supra).
88. This trend was set at the very outset. In his diary for July 30, 1878, six weeks
after he had signed the Posse Comitatus Act, President Hayes wrote:
But in the last resort I am confident that the laws give the Executive ample
power to enforce obedience to United States process. The machinery is cum-
bersome and its exercise will tend to give undue importance to petty attempts
to resist or evade the laws. But I must use such machinery as the laws give.
Then, hypothesizing an extreme case, he continued that if
the sheriffs or other state officers resist the laws, and by the aid of state militia
do it successfully, that is a case of rebellion to be dealt with under the laws
framed to enable the Executive to subdue combinations or conspiracies too
powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary civil officers of the United States.
This involves proclamations, the movement of United States land and naval
forces, and possibly the calling out of volunteers, and this looks like war. It
is like the Whisky Rebellion in the time of Washington. That precedent, if
the case demands it, will be followed.
Then, however, Hayes equated such manifest and open armed rebellion by state officials
with ordinary "mobs" undertaking "to prevent United States officers from enforcing
the laws ;" and without making any distinction between these wholly different situations
he declared: "My duty is plain. The laws must be enforced." 3 DIARY AND L'rMERS OF
RUTHERForm B. HAYES 492-93 (1929). It appears that he thought the statutes now codi-
fied in Title 10 were equally applicable to open insurrection and to, in his own words,
"petty attempts to resist or evade the laws."
A few weeks later, when Hayes' Attorney General advised that the Posse Comitatus
Act precluded the use of troops by marshals to suppress "organized, armed, and fortified
resistance to the collector of internal revenue in Baxter County, Arkansas," he added
the suggestion that Rev. Stat. 1874, § 5298 (now 10 U.S.C. § 332 (1970)) would support
the use of troops for such a situation on the President's order, if only the President first
issue a proclamation to disperse, in order to fulfill the formal requirement of Rev. Stat.
1874, § 5300 (now 10 U.S.C. § 334 (1970)). Three and one-half years later, the next
Attorney General made a similar suggestion that the President could use troops under
Rev. Stat. 1874, § 5298 (now 10 U.S.C. § 332 (1970)) to suppress bands of ordinary
outlaws in the Arizona Territory. 17 Op. Ar''Y GEN. 333, 335 (1882). Cf. id. at 242,
243 (1881), advising that the posse practice was foreclosed for the same exigency, be-
cause of the Posse Comitatus Act. See also 19 id. at 293 (1889) (Oklahoma Territory) ;
id. at 368 (1889) (Alaska Territory). In none of these Attorney General opinions was
there any consideration given to the constitutional limitations upon the use of distinc-
tively military force for civilian law enforcement. The demise of the posse comitatus
form seems to have led to neglect of the fundamental and substantive point of law that
the whole posse comitatus theory of troops use had been devised to preserve; see text ac-
companying notes 27-37 sapra.
602
CIVIL DISTURBANCE REGULATIONS
in fewer domestic circumstances; but it did insure that, when they
were so used, they would be used purportedly under the aegis of the
statutes in Title 10, and thus as a distinctively military rather than as
a civilian force.89
While both the old and the new Civil Disturbance Regulations
recognize that the Posse Comitatus Act places some limits upon the
domestic use of troops, the new regulations view the Act as significantly
more restricted in its impact. For example, the Act as it has stood since
1956"° refers only to the use of the Army or the Air Force. Nevertheless
the 1968 regulations declared that
[a] Ithough the Navy and 'Marine Corps are not expressly
included within its provisions, the act is regarded as national
policy applicable to all military services of the United States.9 '
The new regulations make no such concession, and apparently maintain
that only the Army and the Air Force are affected by the Act.92
Even more significant is another difference between the old and
the new regulations in their treatment of the Posse Comitatus Act. The
old regulations said that the Act precluded any use of troops to enforce
the laws "except as Congress may authorize." 3 The new regulations,
on the other hand, say that the Act precludes such use of troops "except
as authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress." '94 Superficially,
the new regulations are closer to the terms of the Act itself in this
regard, for the Act refers to "the Constitution or Act of Congress ;" but
the point is much more subtle than this. The only express provision
in the Constitution dealing with the domestic use of any troops is Article
I, section 8, clause 15,96 and that clause only gives Congress power to
89. A happier remedy for the abuses over which the 1878 Congress was concerned
might have been legislation preserving the posse comitatus practice but reasserting, and
providing machinery to insure, that in such employment the military personnel are dis-
tinctly civilian in character, subordinate to ordinary civilian laws and institutions, and
not governed by any military law.
90. It was placed in its present form in Title 18 by the Act of August 10, 1956,
ch. 1041, § 18 (a), 70A Stat. 626.
91. 32 C.F.R. § 187.4(b) (1971).
92. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(b) (1973). A bill now pending in Congress would substitute
"the Armed Forces of the United States" for "the Army or the Air Force" in the Posse
Comitatus Act. S. 2318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
93. 32 C.F.R. § 187.4(b) (1971).
94. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(b) (1973) (emphasis added).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1970).
96. That clause gives Congress power "[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia
to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." The
other principal clause in point, article IV, § 4, which provides that "[t]he United States
• . . shall protect each of [the States] . . .on Application of the Legislature, or of the
Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence," does
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provide for calling forth the militia. Moreover, the Constitution gives
to the Co'ngress the power "[t]o make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces,"97 as well as the power "[lt]o
provide . . . for governing such Part of [the militia] as may be
employed in the Service of the United States . . . ."" The text of the
Constitution itself, therefore, seems to refute the suggestion that any
domestic use of troops could be made without authorization by an Act
of Congress. Indeed, even in the absence of such a clear reference of
these powers to the legislative branch, it would be difficult to argue for
any inherent executive power to utilize troops in the face of the direct
prohibition contained in the Posse Comitatus Act. 9 It is therefore
quite accurate to say, as did the old regulations, that the Posse Comitatus
Act precludes any domestic use of federal troops except as authorized
by Congress. The suggestion made in the new regulations that there are
constitutional exceptions to the prohibition of the Posse Comitatus Act,
independent of any Act of Congress, is a foretaste of the extravagant
new claims of inherent executive power contained in those new regula-
tions.
It is notable that the new regulations describe the Posse Comitatus
Act as prohibiting the use of Army or Air Force troops to enforce the
laws "exvcept as authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress."'"0
This is a departure from the wording of the Act itself, which prohibits
their use "except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized
not expressly authorize the use of military troops, as distinguished from a civilian force
such as federal marshals, or (but for the bar of the Posse Comitatus Act) federal
marshals employing troops in a civilian capacity as their posse.
97. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
99. Recall Justice Jackson's famous concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure Case,
where he said:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authoriza-
tion of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate ...
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there
is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority,
or in which its distribution is uncertain ....
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely
only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of
Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control in
such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. Presi-
dential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized
with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitu-
tional system.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635, 637-38 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
100. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(b) (1973) (emphasis added).
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by the Constitution or Act of Congress."'10' Indeed, it is the adverb
"expressly" that captures the essence of the controversy between Presi-
dent Grant and the Congress that led to enactment of the Posse Comitatuis
Act in the first place. 02 The Act was adopted specifically as a repudiation
of claims to an inherent executive power to utilize military troops for
law enforcement.
THE BASES OF THE NEW REGULATIONS
Both the old and the new Civil Disturbance Regulations, as has
already been noted, rely upon the three statutes discussed above, 10
U.S.C. §§ 331, 332, and 333. The problems of constitutionality and
construction of those statutes have an obvious bearing upon the validity
of the regulations, but those problems were the same under the old regu-
lations as they are under the new.
Unlike the old regulations, however, the new regulations are not
content to rely upon these three statutory exceptions to the prohibition
imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act. The new regulations assert that
[t]he Constitution and Acts of Congress establish six excep-
tions, generally applicable within the entire territory of the
United States, to which the Posse Comitatus Act prohibition
does not apply.'03
Of the three additional exceptions now claimed, one purports to be
based upon another congressional enactment, and two purportedly derive
from the Constitution without the benefit of legislation.
House Joint Resolution 1292
The additional statutory authorization for the use of military troops
claimed by the new regulations is House Joint Resolution 1292 of June
6, 1968.04 Although the resolution had been adopted prior to promulga-
tion of the 1968 regulations, those old Civil Disturbance Regulations
did not claim it as any authority for the use of military troops. The
resolution in fact does not refer expressly to any military personnel or
resources at all. It says:
Hereafter, when requested by the Director of the United
States Secret Service, Federal Departments and agencies,
101. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1970) (emphasis added).
102. See text accompanying notes 78-85 supra.
103. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c) (1973) (emphasis added).
104. P.L. 90-331, 82 Stat. 170. The Resolution has not been codified; it is set out in
the notes to 18 U.S.C. § 3056 (1970).
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unless such authority is revoked by the President, shall assist
the Secret Service in the performance of its protective duties
under section 3056 of title 18 of the United States Code and
the first section of this joint resolutio.n.1 "
An "Interdepartmental Agreement Between the Department of Defense
and the Department of the Treasury Concerning Secret Service Protec-
tive Responsibilities,"1 ' signed a few days after House Joint Resolu-
tion 1292 was adopted, and subsequently implemented by a Department
of Defense Directive," 7 deals only with the providing of motor vehicles,
communications, aircraft and crews, medical service, and other logistical
assistance to the Secret Service. Assistance of this type had been pro-
vided to the Secret Service by the Department of Defense for some years
even before House Joint Resolution 1292 was adopted, and this practice
seems never to have been considered as affected by the Posse Comitatus
Act. The Interdepartmental Agreement makes no provision for the
employment of troops.
If equipment and logistical support were all that could be claimed
to be within the scope of House Joint Resolution 1292, there would be
little cause for alarm. But an extremely broad authorization for the
utilization of troops might also be asserted. The resolution, if it is to
be taken to authorize the employment of military troops at all, authorizes
them to "assist the Secret Service in the performance of its protective
duties under section 3056 of title 18 of the United States Code. . .. "10S
Title 18 U.S.C. § 3056 enumerates many duties for the Secret Service,
not all of which can be fit within the resolution's reference to "protec-
tive" duties. One enumerated duty that clearly does fit that description,
however, is the Secret Service's duty to "detect and arrest any person
violating any of the provisions of [section] . . . 871 of this title .... ,09
Title 18 U.S.C. § 871 is the statute forbidding and punishing threats
against the President or Vice President.
Murmurings against the President have been heard before in
times when economic and other domestic problems seemed to be going
untended or at least unsolved. Radical groups might even put together
organized plots, or might be suspected of so doing. The broad power
conferred by 18 U.S.C. § 3056 to "detect and arrest" any persons threat-
105. P.L. 90-331, § 2, 82 Stat. 170.
106. The Interdepartmental Agreement, signed June 10-11, 1968, is on file with
the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL.
107. DOD Directive No. 3025.13, July 15, 1968.
108. See text accompanying note 105 supra.
109. 18 U.S.C. § 3056 (1970).
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ening the President could be taken to justify extensive surveillance and
enforcement activities by the Secret Service in such circumstances. The
Secret Service is broadly authorized to "execute warrants issued under
the authority of the United States," to "offer and pay rewards for
services or information looking toward the apprehension of criminals,"
and to
make arrests without warrant for any offense against the
United States committed in their presence, or for any felony
cognizable under the laws of the United States if they have
reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested
has committed or is committing such felony.11
If House Joint Resolution 1292 does indeed authorize military assistance
to the Secret Service in that function, extensive and widespread military
involvement in the management and suppression of political dissent is
an ominous possibility.
It is noteworthy that the new Regulations specifically point out
that, unlike in the circumstances covered by 10 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332,
and 333, the utilization of military troops pursuant to the authority
claimed to derive from House joint Resolution 1292 does not require
any "personal Presidential action." ' All that is required is the request
of the Director of the Secret Service.
It bears repeating that House Joint Resolution 1292 does not
"expressly" authorize the utilization of military troops; it simply refers
to "Federal Departments and agencies." The Posse Comitatus Act pro-
hibits the use of troops in law enforcement "except in cases and under cir-
cumstances expressly authorized" by Congress.'12 Thus, any claim
that the resolution authorizes the use of military troops to aid in the
Secret Service's law enforcement activities is highly attenuated, to say
the least.
The Constitutional Exceptions
In addition to asserting this new role for military intervention
under House Joint Resolution 1292, the new Civil Disturbance Regula-
tions claim two "constitutional exceptions" to the Posse Comitatus Act's
prohibition. These "constitutional exceptions" are said to be
based upon the inherent legal right of the U.S. Government
110. Id.
111. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c)(2)(i) (1973).
112. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1970) (emphasis added).
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-a sovereign national entity under the Federal Constitution
-to insure the preservation of public order and the carrying
out of governmental operations within its territorial limits, by
force if necessary.
113
Neither of these purported constitutional exceptions deals with circum-
stances in which the utilization of military troops is "expressly authorized
by the Constitution," as the Posse Comitatus Act requires. If they are
indeed exceptions to the prohibition of that Act, therefore, it must be on
the view that the use of troops in such circumstances is a prerogative of
the executive branch with which even a statute so straightforward as the
Posse Comitatus Act cannot interfere. These purported "constitutional
exceptions" to the Act, in other words, represent assertions of inherent
executive power, beyond regulation by the Congress,114 and it would
seem to follow, beyond restraint by the judiciary as well. It will be
remembered that it was precisely to repel any such claim of inherent
power to employ troops that the Posse Comitatus Act was adopted in
1878.115
One of the "constitutional exceptions" claimed by the new regula-
tions pertains to "'protection of Federal property and functions." It
purportedly
[a]uthorizes Federal action, including the use of military
forces, to protect Federal property and Federal governmental
functions when the need for protection exists and duly con-
113. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c) (1) (1973).
114. This is not the first assertion of an illimitable inherent executive power to use
troops. For example, the last published opinion of Attorney General Herbert Brownell,
Jr., who had advised President Eisenhower with regard to his use of federalized Na-
tional Guardsmen and federal troops in connection with the school integration crisis in
Little Rock, Arkansas in 1957, although it relied chiefly upon the provisions of 10 U.S.C.
§§ 332 and 333, also said:
There are in any event grave doubts as to the authority of the Congress to
limit the constitutional powers of the President to enforce the laws and preserve
the peace under circumstances which he deems appropriate. However, that
consideration was not reached because of the express congressional authority
for the action taken.
41 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 313, 331 (1957). The same thesis was advanced by Judge Advocate
General of the Army G. Norman Lieber in his book, THE USE OF THE ARMY IN Am OF
THE CIVIL POWER (1898) ; see note 72 supra. Neither Lieber nor Brownell, however,
could offer any decisional support for their claims. Nor did they attempt to deal with
the substantial body of precedent that supports the contrary view. The most they could
do was rely upon dicta and misapplied quotations from a few cases, such as those dealt
with in note 117 infra. Beyond that, their argument was a naked appeal to seeming ex-
pediency buttressed by suggestions that otherwise there might be no result but tyranny-
an argument which denigrates both the vigor of civilian institutions and the good sense
of Congress in making legislative provision for emergencies.
115. See text accompanying notes 77-85 supra; see also note 99 supra.
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stituted local authorities are unable or decline to provide
adequate protection.116
There is language in some cases supporting a power of self-protective
armed force for the federal government, but that language does not
necessarily support a resort to distinctively military force as an inherent
executive power beyond regulation or restraint by either of the other
branches."' The old regulations, too, had contemplated the use of
military troops to protect federal property and federal activities," 8 but
those regulations had considered this self-protective power to be con-
ferred upon the executive by 10 U.S.C. § 332. Whether that statute
can serve as a sufficient authorization raises a serious constitutional
question, as has already been discussed;"9 but at least the old regula-
tions made no claim that the power to use troops to protect federal
property was inherent in the executive branch and beyond regulation or
restraint by Congress or the courts.
The other purported "constitutional exception" claimed by the
new regulations is far more sweeping, and substantially more unsettling
in its implications. It is boldly captioned "The emergency authority,"
and it purportedly authorizes
prompt and vigorous Federal action, including use of military
forces, to prevent loss of life or wanton destruction of property
and to restore governmental functioning and public order
when sudden and unexpected civil disturbances, disasters,
116. 32 C.F.R. § 215A(c) (1) (ii) (1973).
117. The two passages most frequently relied upon are a holding in Ex parte Sie.
bold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879), and a dictum in In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). In Siebold
the Court said:
We hold it to be an incontrovertible principle, that the government of the United
States may, by means of physical force, exercised through its official agents,
execute on every foot of American soil the powers and functions that belong to
it. This necessarily involves the power to command obedience to its laws, and
hence the power to keep the peace to that extent.
100 U.S. at 395. The facts of Siebold, however, involved federal marshals, not military
troops at all, and nothing the Court said in any way supports the application of distinc-
tively military force. The dictum in Debs declared:
The entire strength of the nation may be used to enforce in any part of the land
the full and free exercise of all national powers and the security of all rights
entrusted by the Constitution to its care . . . . If the emergency arises, the
army of the Nation, and all its militia, are at the service of the Nation to compel
obedience to its laws.
158 U.S. at 582. This dictum, however, does not make any attempt to define what kind
of situation would constitute such an emergency, nor does it pay any heed to the question
of whether the troops could be used as a distinctly military force. After all, the state-
ment was mere dictum, and none of those issues were before the Court.
118. E.g., 32 C.F.R. § 187.5(a) (1) (1971).
119. See text accompanying notes 47-55 supra.
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or calamities seriously endanger life and property and dis-
rupt normal governmental functions to such an extent that
duly constituted local authorities are unable to control the
situations.120
The 1968 regulations contained nothing at all comparable to this bold
claim of inherent executive power to employ federal military force, tak-
ing over from civil authorities both federal and state, without any re-
quest from civilian officials either federal or state, and without legisla-
tive and presumably without judicial restraint. This startling claim
of the new Civil Disturbance Regulations to a so-called "emergency
authority" requires close and sober scrutiny.
Exertion of this inherent power is said to be appropriate when
"civil disturbances, disasters, or calamities" endanger life and property
(whether or not federal property) and "disrupt normal governmental
functions to such an extent that duly constituted local authorities are
unable to control the situations." The term "civil disturbances" is given
a broad definition for purposes of the new regulations, to include not
only "group acts of violence" but also other "disorders prejudicial to
public law and order."'' "Disorder," which is not defined in the regula-
tions, is a term susceptible of many interpretations. So also is the word
"calamities," which is not defined in the regulations. There may be
political or economic or social "calamities"-"disturbances" of the estab-
lished political order-that do not involve "group acts of violence" or
any of the characteristics commonly connoted by terms such as "riot,"
"tumult," and "unlawful assembly" at all.
This inherent power may be invoked, according to the new regu-
lations, when a disorder is serious enough to "disrupt normal govern-
mental functions to such an extent that duly constituted local authorities
are unable to control the situations." The reference to "duly constituted
local authorities" makes it evident that the purported power is to be
invoked when normal state or local governmental functions are disrupted,
and not merely when federal activities are disrupted. Yet there
is no detail given in the regulations as to what constitutes "normalcy"
of governmental functions, what constitutes their "disruption," or what
might constitute "inability" on the part of local authorities to control
a situation. The statutory machinery of 10 U.S.C. § 331 provides for
federal assistance at the request of the states ;122 but this purported extra-
120. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c)(1)(i) (1973).
121. Id. § 215.3(a).
122. Although when properly construed, § 331 applies only to genuine insurrec-
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statutory "emergency authority" would support federal military inter-
vention in a state without any request from the state at all, even where
the intervention was purportedly for the purpose of enforcing state law.
The judgment as to whether local authorities are able to control a situa-
tion is to be made, not by local or state governmental officials, but by the
federal official or officials designated elsewhere in the regulations." 8
Moreover, according to the new regulations the role that the federal
troops are to play in such situations is not a subordinate role of assistance
to civil authorities in their own enforcement of the laws. Rather, on the
premise that the local civil authorities are "unable to control" the situa-
tion, the troops are given a free hand to "restore governmental function-
ing and public order ....
It is therefore important to determine just who, according to the
new regulations, is to make these critical judgments in the context of
this so-called "emergency authority:" what constitutes a "civil disturb-
ance," "disorder," or "calamity"? When is life or property endangered?
When have governmental functions been disrupted sufficiently to justify
the use of federal troops? And, once federal troops have intervened on
these grounds, when have public order and governmental functioning
been sufficiently "restored" to warrant withdrawal of the military forces?
The claim of inherent executive power upon which this purported
"emergency authority" regulation is based excludes the Congress and
apparently also the courts from either making or reviewing these judg-
ments. Neither is it contemplated, however, that these critical judgments
ordinarily will be made by the President. The regulations specifically
provide that instances within this "emergency authority" are exceptions
to the rule that military intervention "will normally be predicated upon
the issuance of a Presidential Executive order or Presidential direc-
tive . *.".. ,125 They are exceptions also to the rule that directives for
the use of troops will be restricted to the restoration of law and order
"in a specific State or locality.' 2
Each of the statutes in Title 10 of the United States Code, whatever
its faults in other respects, at least requires some personal act of the
President before federal troops as a distinctly military force may be
employed. The new Civil Disturbance Regulations, in contrast, not only
tions, see text accompanying notes 14-26 supra, the new regulations regard it as apply-
ing in lesser situations of domestic violence as well.
123. See the final section of this article, SUPERVISION, COMMAND AND CONTROL,
infra.
124. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c)(1)(i) (1973).
125. Id. § 215.5 (a).
126. Id.
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purport to increase substantially the variety of circumstances in which
federal troops may be employed by contriving new exceptions to the
Posse Comitatus Act, but they also maintain that the critical decisions
concerning their use in these new circumstances are to be made, not by
the President at all, but by inferior and even by military officials. The
new regulations' provisions on supervision, command and control are
examined in the next section of this article.
SUPERVISION, COMMAND AND CONTROL
General supervisory responsibility for planning and coordinating
the use of military troops in civil disorders is vested by the new regula-
tions in the Secretary of the Army (or the Under Secretary of the Army,
as his designee). With regard to situations falling within the scope of
10 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332, or 333, the Secretary of the Army is delegated
"any and all of the authority of the President" which may be otherwise
delegated to the Secretary of Defense.127 This delegation, however,
does not eliminate the requirement of "personal Presidential action"
as a prerequisite to the use of troops under any of those three statutes. 128
Beyond the limits of those three statutes, however, and in all circum-
stances in which according to the new regulations no "personal Presiden-
tial action" is required, the Secretary of the Army is designated to serve
as "Executive Agent for the Department of Defense" for all civil dis-
turbance matters. 129 In this capacity as Executive Agent the Secretary
of the Army, or the Under Secretary as his designee, is responsible for
establishing policies, plans, procedures, command arrangements and
intelligence data to facilitate civil disturbance control activities by the
military.'
Actual operational control of any troops, however, is to be under the
direction of uniformed military commanders. Military resources are
to be made available by the military departments upon the call of the
Secretary of the Army as Executive Agent;... but thereafter the Secre-
tary's authority to direct the troops is to be exercised "through the Chief
of Staff, U.S. Army . . . . ,, Under the Army Chief of Staff there
is created a "Directorate of Military Support" composed of military
officers; and it is this Directorate, according to the regulations, that
"will plan, coordinate, and direct civil disturbance operations."'32
127. Id. § 215.5(c).
128. Id. § 215.4 (c) (2) (i).
129. Id. § 215.6(a).
130. Id. §§ 215.6(a) (1), (3), (7), (10), and (13).
131. Id. § 215.7(a) (1).
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With respect to on-the-scene command and control, the regulations
make no provision for civilian supervision. There is an exhortation to
"DOD components and their subordinate activities" to
coordinate with local civil authorities or local military com-
manders as appropriate, to assure mutual understanding of the
policies and procedures to be adhered to in an actual or antici-
pated civil disturbance situation,'
but coordination is not to be understood as the subjection of federal
troops to any civilian command. Quite to the contrary, in fact, the
regulations specifically provide that
[a]t objective areas, designated task force commanders
will exercise operational control over all military forces as-
signed for employment in the event of civil disturbances.3 5
In sum, what is contemplated by the Civil Disturbance Regulatiois
is not at all the utilization of military personnel under the command of
civilian law enforcement officials as a civilian force, subject to civilian
laws, in the nature of a posse comitatus. What is contemplated, instead,
is a distinctively military force, under uniformed military commanders in
a chain of command culminating at the military Directorate under the
Army Chief of Staff, governed not by civilian but by military law, and
subordinated to no local or state official nor to any federal civilian
official except the Secretary of the Army. Even the Secretary of the
Army's role of "[e]xercising . . . the direction of military resources
committed or assigned for employment in the event of actual or potential
civil disturbances"' 38 does not assure any significant civilian supervision
of operations, because this direction is to be exercised only "through
designated military commanders"' 3 -the military Directorate, and under
the Directorate, the military task force commanders.
The fact that the regulations provide for military response even to
"potential" civil disturbances is important. Most of the constitutional
authorities actually maintain that distinctly military force may not
lawfully be employed until after an armed assault against the institutions
of civilian government has been successful, a fait accompli."' In con-
132. Id. § 215.7(a) (2).
133. Id. § 215.8(b).
134. Id. § 215.5(e).
135. Id. § 215.7(c).
136. Id. § 215.6 (a) (6).
137. Id.
138. E.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866).
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trast, the Civil Disturbance Regulations purport to authorize the ap-
plication of distinctly military force, not only in instances of actual dis-
order falling short of genuine insurrection, but even in instances of
"'potential" civil disturbances. With "civil disturbances" defined by
the regulations in such broad and indefinite terms as "disorders pre-
judicial to public law and order,"1 9 and with an inherent executive power
being claimed to deal with undefined "calamities,"'"" the attempt to
justify military action in cases of "potential" civil disorders goes far,
far beyond anything that can find colorable support in constitutional
jurisprudence.
For dealing with "potential" civil disturbances, the regulations
authorize "prepositioning predesignated ground forces. . . ." ' How-
ever efficient prepositioning may seem as a means of facilitating prompt
suppression of disorder when it occurs, it is also true that the preposi-
tioning of troops can intimidate citizens and chill the exercise of con-
stitutional rights. It will be recalled that President Grant's defense of
prepositioning. was unpersuasive to the Congress in the 1870's, and
that Congress enacted the Posse Comitatus Act in large part because
of the intimidation they felt voters must have suffered because of soldiers
prepositioned to prevent potential disorders at the polls."4 3 Nonetheless,
the Civil Disturbance Regulations specifically provide for prepositioning
of federal troops. Prepositioning in one place of "'more than a battalion-
sized unit" may be undertaken only after a request for prepositioning
has been addressed to the Attorney General and. approved by the Presi-
dent;"" but units as large as a battalion may be prepositioned on the
order of military commanders alone whenever, in the judgment of those
military commanders, circumstances of so-called "potential civil disturb-
ances" might warrant.
The regulations also provide for Pentagon control of the release of
information concerning civil disturbance operations of the military.145
Apparently this information control applies to preparations and pre-
positioning for "potential civil disturbances" as well as to activities after
troops have been deployed.
It is therefore quite possible that highly significant action could be
taken, distinctively military in character, including the prepositioning of
139. 32 C.F.R. § 215.3(a) (1973).
140. Id. § 215.4(c) (1) (i).
141. Id. § 215.6(a) (6).
142. See text accompanying note 77 .upra.
143. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
144. 32 C.F.R. § 215.5(g) (1973) (emphasis added).
145. Id. § 215.6(f).
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battalions of troops in different places as well as the actual employment
of troops, in order to deal with actual or merely potential situations
thought by military commanders to come within the new regulations'
vague and expansive concepts of "civil disturbances" and "the emergency
authority." This could be done without any Presidential participation
in the critical decisionmaking at all. In fact, it seems, all of this could
be done on the decision of no one higher than the military Directorate,
or its superior commander, the Army Chief of Staff, without the partici-
pation of any civilian official at all.
The President, of course, remains Commander-in-Chief. As such
he could certainly exert his superior command power to order troops
withdrawn, or otherwise to countermand inferior officers' orders. Out-
right insubordination to the Commander-in-Chief would be a greater
breach of discipline than American military officers are likely to indulge.
The real military threat to civilian institutions arises from possibilities
less remote-possibilities of military intervention for which there is
colorable authority in law, and in particular, in the new Civil Disturbance
Regulations.
Even under a President devoted to free civilian procedures, con-
fident of the political process, tolerant of vigorous dissent, and suspicious
of military power, the risk of untoward military intervention under color
of the new regulations would warrant grave concern. The danger would
be far greater under a President seriously deficient in any of those traits.
The danger also seems enhanced by the presence in major positions of
policy responsibility within the civilian government, of individuals with
strong military ties. The most intimate presidential advisor during the
last fifteen months of the Nixon administration was a career military
man, a four-star general who had been Vice-Chief of Staff of the Army,
and who retired from active duty only after a controversy was raised
over his appointment in the face of a statutory prohibition." ' It is
146. Title 10 U.S.C. § 973(b) (1970) provides that
Except as otherwise provided by law, no officer on the active list of the
Regular Army, Regular Navy, Regular Air Force, Regular Marine Corps, or
Regular Coast Guard may hold a civil office by election or appointment, whether
under the United States, a Territory or possession, or a State. The accep-
tance of such a civil office or the exercise of its functions by such an officer
terminates his military appointment.
The incumbent Attorney General, William Saxbe, whose functions include receiving
and passing on any requests for the prepositioning of troops, 32 C.F.R. § 215.5(g)
(1973), also has a military background. Now inactive as a Colonel in the Ohio Na-
tional Guard, he was active in the Guard throughout his political career until 1968 when
he joined the United States Senate. He recounted his military ties at his confirmation
hearings, and chose to be sworn in to martial music by the United States Army Band,
the oath being administered by a judge of the Military Court of Appeals.
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worth recalling that some of the most notable excesses of military inter-
vention in domestic affairs in this nation's prior history occurred a cen-
tury ago during the Presidency of a career military general, Ulysses S.
Grant. 4 '
CoNcLusIoN
The new Civil Disturbance Regulations do provide a cover of seem-
ing legality for extreme measures of military intervention in domestic
civilian affairs. It would be foolish to assume that, despite these pro-
visions, the kind of military intervention and military domination of
civilian government that has been experienced in some other erstwhile
democratic countries is somehow impossible here. Perhaps political
leaders will be successful in averting any occasion for such extremes of
intervention here as would amount substantially to a military takeover.
The possibility, however, at least serves to underscore the profound
seriousness of the legal issues raised by the new regulations, and also
by the statutes upon which, in part, they purport to rely.
Judicial challenge to the statutes and regulations concerning domes-
tic use of troops is impracticable. Attempts to obtain declaratory or
injunctive relief in advance of some actually imminent situation founder
all too easily on case or controversy grounds.'48 While disorder is
rampant and troops are actually deployed, it would be a bold and uncom-
mon judge who would dare interpose his judgment. And after the fact,
unless cognizable damages are claimed, the bar of mootness may be
raised. Even where damages are claimed to have been suffered, as in
the Kent State Cases involving state military troops, the tendency of
courts is to seek a narrow ground for decision, and to make only muted
reference to the constitutional tradition that is at stake.'49 Judicial
outcries like those that denounced Lincoln's excesses of militarism at
the time of the Civil War... have been rare, although significant.
This is a field, consequently, in which restoration and protection
of the constitutional due process tradition, which forbids the intervention
of distinctly military force in domestic situations short of genuine in-
surrection, is primarily the responsibility of Congress. A congressional
repudiation of the claims of inherent executive military powers claimed
in the new Civil Disturbance Regulations, together with a thorough-
147. See text accompanying notes 69-80 supra.
148. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
149. See, e.g., the excerpt quoted in the text accompanying note 2 supra.
150. See note 48 supra.
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going revision of 10 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332, and 333, is required. 5 If
Congress does not act, one of the oldest and dearest principles of our
constitutional heritage will continue to wither-and may very soon perish
-from neglect.
151. An informed revision of the Posse Comitatus Act would also be useful. Such
a revision could make available the personnel and resources of the Department of De-
fense to assist in the control of civil disorders, for example, and to enforce state or
federal law, while insuring compliance with the essential requisites of the constitutional
tradition of due process in a fashion comparable to Lord Mansfield's doctrine. The
"posse" model might today seem quaint, but its essence can be preserved. What is essen-
tial is the recognition and enforcement of the principles that whenever military personnel
are utilized domestically in less than a genuine insurrection, they are civilian and not
military in character; they are not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice or
any other principles of military law; they are subject to the control and direction of the
civilian officials who would have charge of the situation if the military personnel had
not been employed; they are governed by the same rules of law and standards of liability
that apply to nonmilitary personnel in the same situation; and they are seriously in
need of retraining, because these are not the standards to which federal military troops
for the past several years have been trained.
